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Preface

While I was researching this paper~ some Muslilns shared with lne one of their
sayings, "Islam is like water. it takes the fonn of the rocks over which it flows." Their
metaphorical message was that each culture interprets Islam differently, something that
Western societies typically do not acknowledge. According to Islamic tradition, wearing
h~iab

is a hadith, or Prophet's saying, for women to dress modestly. As each culture

interprets Islam according to its own mores, wearing

h~iab

takes many forms .

One of the problems in writing about Muslinl women's practice of covering their
head and bodies is the variety of images it evokes. The h~jab is the most frequently worn
headcovering. Essentially it is a piece of clothing that covers the hair and neck, though
there are many variations on this design. When people talk of the Muslim headscarf, they
are referring to the h~iab. The burqa and niqab are both examples of Muslim
headcovering, but they are much more extreme types than the

h~iab.

The niqab covers the

entire face as well as the neck and head, leaving only a small hole for the eyes. The burqa

..
..
..
.
..
...

..

is similar to the niqab, but it includes a mesh cloth to cover the eyes and a robe to cover
the body. Variations of the niqab and hurqa are what the Taliban and the Iranian officials
require women to wear in their respective states. Thus, it is erroneous to claim that a
woman who wears the hijab is veiled, as vei led wOlnen wear sOll1ething resetnbling a

burqa or a niqab. For the purposes of this research, I will use the ternl h(jab to designate
all moderate Muslim headcoverings, the ternl 'veil' to designate anything that covers
more than the head and neck, and the phrase "headscarf debate' to refer to France's

I 'affaire du foulard .

..
..

..
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Hijab, niqab, burqa. Hat, scar( raincoat. All of these items are used by women to
cover their hair and various body parts; yet only one type of clothing has been branded by
Western societies as oppressive. How can a simple piece of cloth cause so much debate?

...

Intense debates such as the current headscarf debate in France arise when cultural

..

traditions and stereotypes are transferred onto one type of clothing, and onto the people

.
..
..
.

wearing that article of clothing. As we will see, the debate over hijab is due to cultural
misunderstandings and stereotypes that disregard the Western principles of freedom of
choice .

Introduction

Over the past several decades Europe has seen a significant increase in its Muslim
populations. Sonle claim that Islam is now Europe's second religion, although that is not
an officially dOCUl11ented fact, owing to a lack of definitive surveys on religious practices

...
...

..
..
..
...
III

...
...

in European countries. What is true is that cultural misunderstandings between Europeans
and Muslims are occurring at increasing rates. The media outlets in Europe cover stories
that usually portray Muslims in a negative light. Events such as Madrid's March 1L 2004
certainly do not help foster a positive image of Islatn in the 111edia. The young Dutch
Moroccan who killed Theo van Gogh, a filmmaker critical of Islam, made international
headlines as a vengeful, fanatical Muslil11. Islamophobia is on the rise in Europe. France's
newly enacted loi laique, or secular law, is an exaggerated case of western European
sentinlent towards its newest demographic addition .
Widespread nledia coverage of I 'c~fraire duf()ulard, or the headscarf debate,
began in October 1989 when three Muslinl girls were expelled temporarily from their

..
..
..

.
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Creil middle schoot north of Paris. for refusing to remove their Muslim h{jab. Their
fathers went to court over the issue, with the support of the local Islalnic cOlnlnunity. The

Conseil d'Etat, the highest judicial administration in France, rendered its decision on
November 27, 1989, recognizing students' freedom of choice to wear religious symbols
("Le Rapport" 19). Although ruling in favor of the students' right to wear religious
sYlnbols, the Conseil also attached four vague stipulations to its decision that prohibited
religious proselytization, rejected racist behavior or behavior that attacked plurality,

.
..
..

decision sparked an open, continuing debate, fueled by media coverage. over the

...

definition of secularity in French public schools .

...

..
..
..
..
..
..
..

excluded action that disrupts the classrooln, and affirmed the neutrality of public school
programs and teachers C"Le Rapport" 19). The decision to expel was given to individual
schools, thereby allowing the government to cOlnmit itself to a ruling but also adding to
the ambiguity of hijabs and secularity in schools. This expulsion and the Conseil d'Etat

Similar instances have occurred since the 1989 ruling, each case highlighting the
ambiguity of the secular principle and the social tensions between Muslims and
traditional French society. Each story that reached the media served to fuel both French
concerns of radical Muslim influence and Musliln concerns of misrepresentation of
Islam. There are exaggerated stories of Muslinl fathers refusing to allow their daughters
to attend physical education or biology classes, claiming it was against their religion. In
2003, Lila and Alma Levy became the center of the debate when their school sent them a
letter claiming their headscarves were conspicuous and incompatible with physical
education courses, and forbade them to enter the school while wearing the hijab. Their
father, a lawyer with Jewish heritage, defended their right to go to school (Schofield). As

.
.
.
III
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5
the headscarf debate intensified in the French media and public opinion, so too did the
rhetoric shift from simply upholding secular principles to concerns of Muslim
proselytization in French schools and misogyny within Muslim culture. While these
concerns are not limited to the Muslim community, the head scarf debate scrutinizes the
Muslim community to a greater extent than other communities in France. The hUab, in
the opinion of some French citizens, is an external indicator of internal problems as well
as a public proclamation of faith.
In July 2003, President Jacques Chirac commissioned an investigative panel, the
Stasi Commission, headed by government ombudsman Bernard Stasi, to examine
secularity in public schools. The Conlmission interviewed French citizens from diverse

..

2003 ("'Le Rapport" 1). Based on the Commission's recommendations, the French

...

government inserted into the education code Article 141-5-1 of law no. 2004-228 on

...

backgrounds and issued its findings and recommendations to the President in December

March 15, 2004, prohibiting students in public schools from wearing "signs or apparel
through which students ostensibly display religious nlembership" (LOI n° 2004-228) I.

...

..
..
...
...
...

The law is sometimes referred to by French media as the' veil ban.' Since the first day of
classes in September 2004, there have been several cases of expulsion of Muslim girls
who refused to remove their hijabs and several Sikhs who refused to remove their
turbans, but the school environment has remained relatively calm .
The 2004 French ban on religious symbols in public schools triggered various
reactions from different groups within France. Not surprisingly, some in the Muslim
community interpreted it as a law targeting them. Several Muslim groups called for the
law's repeal while others suggested government pamphlets to define acceptable secular
I

...

..

Quote translated from French. All translations in this paper are my own .

.
..

..
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behavior. The more conservative Christian groups. such as the French Catholic

bishops~

also opposed the law, claiming that it infringed upon citizens' rights to religious freedom
("French Cardinal"). However, one spring 2004 poll indicated that 70% of French
citizens support a secular ban such as the law proscribes (Brenner 196). The French
government argues that the law will protect the Republic's founding principle of
secularity. Muslim and other religious leaders counter that the law is xenophobic and
does not allow students the right to practice their religion. There is. however., one element
that is largely missing from the highly publicized head scarf debate: the perspectives of
the girls and women who wear the hUah.
Despite the plethora of images of girls and women in hijahs or veils, their

...

individual voices are largely unheard in the debate. The girls and women themselves,

..
.

with a few vocal exceptions who assume representation for the culturally diverse Muslim

...
...

..
..
..
..
..

groups, are invisible. Printing a picture of a girl wearing a hUah and calling her oppressed
due to the headscarf does not give her a

voice~

it nlerely transfers the photographer's

opinions onto her now synlbolic face. Interviewing a veiled woman., then publishing a
report on the veil that represents Muslim \vomen as oppressed is not necessarily
championing her cause: it is nlerely rendering her invisible and sytnbolic by interpreting
her words through a Western cultural context. Promoting gender equity and religious
tolerance by forcing girls in public schools to remove their hijabs does not make them
equal; it merely exacerbates their status as foreign in the host culture. Although women's

bodies are the central focus of the debate, "vomen's

voices~

their diversity of thought and

experience, remain largely unheard, overshadowed by the symbolism that each side
accords to wearing the hijah .

..

.
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French Culture and Politics
History of Secularity in French Culture
French citizens are proud of their national identity. forged from centuries of art.
language, gastronomy. and politics. all of which are reflected in the national culture.

..

.
..

..
.

..
..
..
..

There are relatively few displays of nationalistic pride in France as compared to the
United States, where flag-waving and reciting the pledge of allegiance are common. In
place of these conspicuous displays of patriotislTI, the French citizenry pays homage to its
rich cultural heritage by adhering to certain centuries-old traditions. The Academie

Franc;aise is a national institute designed to maintain the purity of the French language
and culture. Mainstream French society, by which I ll1ean the majority population of
white, middle-class citizens of Catholic heritage. values the ideals of the French
Revolution, such as the principle of secularity, or la lalcite. The gastronomic reputation,
the heritage of language, literature, music, and the arts, the changes instituted by the
French Revolution and the rights of man, all are aspects of the French national identity in
which French citizens take pride. Upholding secularity in public institutions is one aspect
of French national culture. Originating from the ideas of the Enlightenment and the
French Revolution, French perspectives firmly reject religion in favor of a state instituted

..

policy of secularity .

...

general French populace, began to reconsider the hitherto accepted dominance of the

..
..

monarchy and the Catholic Church. Works such as The Social Contract by Rousseau and

..

During the eighteenth century or the Enlightenment the elite. and by proxy the

Candide by Voltaire presented liberal ideals of individual human worth and new systems
of self-government. Their ideas challenged the authority of the Catholic Church and the

-..

..

-
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monarchy who ruled by the divine mandate of the king and the separation of society into
estates. The rationality inspired by the Enlightenment led the French people to analyze
and question their fiscal system, in which the Third Estate was heavily taxed by the
monarchy. Ideas of social reform originating in the French Enlightenment became the
philosophical framework for the French Revolution.
The French Revolution ushered in a new set of beliefs about French government

..

..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..

..
..
..
..

and society that differed considerably from the values held during the Ancien Regime. In
addition to ending the absolute rule of the monarchy and the separation of the French
population into the three Estates, the revolutionaries questioned the supreme authority of
the Catholic Church over governmental affairs. Consequently, the governing bodies
immediately following the fall of the monarchy accorded less power and prestige to the
Church. In 1790, the National Assembly passed the Civil Constitution of the

Clergy~

requiring the clergy to swear allegiance to the State and in doing so to accept State
salaries. In 1801, Napoleon Bonaparte signed the Concordat with the Catholic Church,
asserting that although Catholicism was the 111ajority French religion, there was no
official state religion. Thus, the revolutionary struggles against the abuses of the Catholic
Church brought about the beginnings of the separation of Church and State in France,
although it would be another century before the French government would officially
enact secular laws.
The contemporary French concept of laicite is born from the anti-elite, and thus
anti-Church, struggles of the French Revolution and the nineteenth- and twentiethcentury laws that implemented secular principles. After Bonaparte's reign, the country
briefly became a constitutional monarchy before developing into a repUblic. The Catholic

..
..
..
III
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Church~

however, would never again attain the degree of power it had enjoyed during the

Ancien Regime. The first series of secular school laws was enacted between 1881 and
1886, when Minister of Education Jules Ferry championed the removal of the Catholic
Church's influence from public education. The subsequent law of 1905 formally provided
for the separation of Church and State in education and Article II of the 1958
Constitution declared the separation of Church and State as a principle of the French
Republic .
Although these laws seem straightforward, their historical context provides
another perspective. Early twentieth-century France included three major religions or
sects:

Catholicism~

Protestantism. and Judaisnl. Each religion controlled some

representation in the government and society, although Catholics were the majority and
Jewish practitioners were stillinarginalized despite this minority representation. Due to
the comnlon Judeo-Christian heritage of the three major religions or sects, the laws of
1881 and 1905 did not contradict public religious practices of Catholic, Protestant or
Jewish people. Since the early twentieth century, though, the French population's
demographics have expanded to include more religious diversity, in particular Islam .
In addition to its secular principles, France' s universalist assinlilation principle
also defines the French national identity. Whereas in the United States people attach
ethnic modifiers to the label American, such as African-American, Hispanic-American,
etc., no similar practices combining ethnic origin and current nationality exist in France .
Instead, in official state surveys and censuses, all citizens are classified as "French."
While the label French has different meanings for different people, mainstream French
culture is proud of its assimilationist values. Rather than target certain groups as part un-

.

..

..

...
...
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French and thus different by labels of ethnic origin like Tunisian-French, the discreet ailn
of France's assimilation principle is to recognize the common link among all the
population, that of French residency. Assimilation of citizens as French is an effort to
"level all playing fields" into a universal category without discrimination but also an
attempt to preserve traditional French culture and heritage against changes brought by
inlmi grati 0 n.
As when any widely accepted cultural value is challenged by another group,
problems arise. In France, several waves of Maghreb and African immigration to France
have brought a new population of residents with cultures, languages, and religions
different frOin those of mainstream French society. Given French society's pride in its
culture and heritage, immigrants wishing to reside in France are expected to share similar
pride in their adopted country. Problems arise, however, when the immigrants' motive for
migration is not cultural but econOinic. Then, as is demonstrated by current clashes
between some Muslim immigrants and 111ainstreatn French citizens, certain immigrants
view France's universalist assilnilation principle as the denland to forget their native
traditions in order to assimilate fully into a French culture that is indifferent to cultural
diversity. A cycle of cultural misunderstanding, miscomnlunication, and misdirection has
developed between mainstreanl French citizens and the Muslinl inlmigrant popUlation,
due in part to mainstream French society's principle of universalist assilnilation .

..
..

..
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Origins of Contemporary French Politics and Attitudes towards Muslim."
The French goverl1l11ent's attitude toward its colonies during colonization
consisted of a mission civilisatrice, or civilizing mission, that continues to affect in part
France's relationships with its former colonies today. Like other European countries,

..
..
..

-..
..

..

-

France entered into colonization for the new markets and supply of raw tnaterials that the
colonized countries provided. The intellectual difficulty arose in trying to justify how the
country of les droits de I 'homme, the rights of man, could exploit another people. In
keeping with the institutionalized racism of nineteenth-century Europe that justified
subjugating and exploiting peoples through colonization. France developed the mission

civilisatrice policy toward its colonies, sinlilar to colonial policies of other European
countries. Cultural and biological theories contrasted the supposed superiority of the fairskinned French people (they were educated and therefore civilized) with the inferiority of
the darker skinned peoples of Africa and the Maghreb (who were not educated according
to European standards and thus uncivilized). These theories supported the French idea
that through colonization these "savage" peoples could be civilized. France's educational
system in its colonies dissimulated the mission civilisatrice policy, attempting to
assimilate the natives to European standards. As a result, students were educated in
European subjects such as literature, but they could not use those skills to survive in their
native lands. In practice, the cultural ilnperative of the mission civilisatrice pennitted
French colonizers to subjugate, denigrate, and "educate" colonized peoples to conform to
French standards of behavior while slowly killing the native cultures.
The negative effects of the mission civilisatrice are still present today as France
maintains ties with, if not government influence oveL its former colonies and

..

-..
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protectorates. The most obvious example of France's influence is the DOM-TOMs,
overseas departments and territories that are considered part of France. Citizens from
these overseas departments and former French colonies come to France to receive an
education, such as Martinique playwright and poet Ainle Cesaire and writer and the

-

former president of Senegal Leopold Sedar Senghor. Francophone writers still address
issues of identity originating fronl the effects of the mis,,,'ion civilisatrice. in which France
is associated with knowledge and culture while their native countries and cultures are
undervalued. For most Francophone writers, who represent their societies' attitudes in

..
...

..
..

part, it is difficult to reconcile the aforementioned associations into one identity. Nor is
the mission civilisatrice exclusively operative outside France; it affects contemporary
French society'S general attitude toward foreigners .
While not as blatantly racist as the mission civilisalrice. nlainstream French
society's attitude is not welconling towards those who do not eillulate French standards .
French citizens are fiercely proud of their heritage and

culture~

and do not adapt well to

forces that may change that heritage, which makes the native-foreigner dichotomy a
difficult one for foreigners. During the tinle of social change in the 1980s, when the

.

-..
..
..

period of economic boom in France known as the "Thirty Glorious Years" was fading
away, hostility toward the new Muslim population grew into a scapegoat-like attitude.
France was having its own identity crisis amidst the econonlic downturn, and its citizens
were searching for traditional points of reference that were fami Iiar and comforting,
rather than embracing a new culture enlerging within their country. It was during this
time that anti-Muslin1 and anti-immigrant attitudes emerged, the best-known example
being Jean-Marie Le Pen and his National Front party, who claimed that France's

.
III
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national identity was being threatened by inlmigrants (Wieviorka. 134-135). Nicknatnes
for immigrants emerged amidst this anti-immigrant rhetoric. Even though Muslims may

III

be legal French citizens. the French regard them as foreigners. which is not a positive
term in the French vocabulary.

III

.
.
..

Children of iminigrants. Muslims especially. often occupy a marginalized position
in mainstream French society, which is composed principally of white, middle-class
citizens fronl Catholic backgrounds. Racial epithets such as ·'hew·.·· used to describe the
second- or third- generation children of Maghrebi inlmigrants. or r.'black," used to
describe the dark-skinned inlmigrants from Africa. are part of the vernacular. Born as
French citizens, the second- and third-generation children of immigrants are nevertheless
alienated from mainstream French society, due to their apparent connection to the
traditions of other cultures and religions. The French govemnlent's policies, such as the
1993 Pasqua law that required all children of immigrants to apply for French citizenship
at 18 years of age or forfeit the right (Pauly 47), and the attitudes of some French, which

III

..

stereotype Muslims as radical terrorists. make it difficult for Muslims to integrate into
mainstrealn French society while nlaintaining the traditions of their cultures of origin .
The relationship between mainstream French citizens and Musliln citizens or inlmigrants

III

..
..
..
.
..

renlains precarious. with resentment and lack of effective integration on both sides .
There are recognized indicators, attitudes, and opinions in French society that
constitute the label "native French person," a positive label that contrasts with ideas about
foreigners. These markers include French cuisine, religious heritage froin the Catholic
Church, adherence to customs of fa Patrie and correct use of the French language.
Emulating these cultural indicators and belonging to families that have lived for 111any

..
.
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generations in France grants the label "'native" in France, which corresponds to a general
social acceptance. One can act and behave according to one's own personality without

III

concern that one's actions and behaviors will be interpreted as representative of an entire
culture. This same liberty of behavior is not accorded to those labeled '''foreign'' in

-

France. Many signs identify someone as foreign, the nlost obvious being that one speaks
French with a non-French accent, or one looks or dresses according to customs not
generally observed in France. As is the case with the beur labeL one can be a French

..
III

.

citizen and still be identified by other French people as a foreigner, so strong is the
French sense of tradition and heritage. Due to the fact that the majority of French citizens
are identified as native, with families who have lived in France for generations, native
French citizens hold more power in society, including the power to react negatively to
foreigners. Compared with the national average, communities of Muslinls are more likely
to be relegated to shabby housing in poor areas, or kept apart froll1 mainstream society, or

..

-.
III

not given as much social and/or financial aid, and/or frequently discriminated against for
jobs (Hunter & Leveau 9). Due to the strong native-foreigner dichotomy in France,
foreigners are allowed nluch less room to act as individuals and are instead regarded by
native white French as a honl0geneous group .

Muslim Diaspora and Presence in France
Historical Context of Muslims in France
France has had direct political involvenlent with Muslims for over two centuries,

III

III

-

mostly from the Maghreb, the region that includes Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco. In
1830, France invaded Algeria, which became an occupied French colony until gaining its

..
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independence in 1962. France also made Tunisia and Morocco protectorates in 1881 and

III

1912, respectively; both gained independence in 1956 ("North Africa"). During the
period of colonization, the French govermnent in the colonies accepted the traditions of
III

the Muslim population to Ininimize Muslinl unrest. However, if a Muslim living in the
Maghreb wanted to become a French citizen, he or she had to accept French laws
affecting marriage and inheritance, and reject the jurisdiction of Islalnic courts,

...

effectively rejecting his or her faith in order to assinlilate into secular France
(,·Colonization and Military Control"). This culturally hegemonic attitude did not

.
.

dissipate after the colonies gained independence, nor as the Muslim population in France
increased significantly. Owing in part to the growing Muslim population in France,
French society'S general attitude toward all Muslims relnains negative even for thirdgeneration imlnigrants and French-born converts to Islam.
Muslim immigration to France began as a symbiotic relationship between the

.

French government, which needed unskilled laborers to help cheaply rebuild the
economy and infrastructure after the two World Wars, and the nlostIy lVlaghrebi

...

temporary workers, who needed jobs that their home countries could not supply. During

..

World War I the French governnlent recruited Maghrebi workers to work in the mines .

...

After the war, nlore workers \vere recruited to assist in postwar reconstruction. France
again used Maghrebi labor during World War II, even demanding the governors of
Algiers, Oran, and Constantine to dispatch 10,000 workers per month (Hunter & Leveau

..

..
-

5). Again, postwar reconstruction brought n10re temporary unskilled workers from
predominantly Muslim countries, mostly fron1 the Maghreb. The demographic profile of
these workers, the so-called ·'reserve forces of capitalism" (Leveau 92). were Inostly

16

.
.
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single males. In the 1950s and 1960s, the wars for independence in the Maghreb
contributed to some Maghrebi immigration, though the Muslim population did not
increase significantly. Soon, however, the demographics and size of the Muslim presence
in France began to increase as the government changed its immigration policies during
the 1970s .
By the 1970s the economic boom had ended in France, also ending the need for
foreign laborers. Rising unemployment and an OPEC-induced oil crisis in 1973 caused
the French government to halt foreign labor immigration in 1974 (Pauly 36). Faced with
the prospect of returning to depleted. ilnpoverished home countries wilhout being able to
return to France to work, the Maghrebi telnporary workers opted to remain in France .
Instead of accepting incentives to return to their native countries as the French
government wished, the inlmigrant workers began to settle permanently in France and to
call for their families to join them (Hunter & Leveau 5-6). After the 1970s the majority of
Maghrebi Muslim immigration to France was composed of women and children, whom

..
..
..

.
...

-

the French government reluctantly permitted to immigrate. This fanlily reunification
trend created a large, permanent Muslinl presence in France .

Demographics and Socioeconomic Status afMuslims in France
Although much French media attention focuses on the Maghrebi majority of
Muslims, the contemporary French Muslim population includes imlnigrants from Libya,
Turkey, and sub-Saharan Africa, as well as French-born converts, all of whom have had
difficulties living in France. Ironically, the stereotype of the Maghrebis as Arabic is be
misleading, as Muslim conquerors introduced Islam in the eighth century and the

-
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Ottoman Empire colonized the Maghreb region in the fifteenth century. The Maghreb and

..

-

its peoples cannot be labeled solely' Arab' or 'Muslim,' as native cultures such as Berber
are still alive.

Thus~

although the nlajority of Muslinls in France today hail from the

Maghreb region, the Muslim community is diverse in its ethnography. as well as in its
cultural and religious practices.
Compared to the French population as a whole, Muslim communities in France

...

-..
-

are relatively poor. Much of the Muslim population lives in poor conditions in the
suburbs of large cities. As many as 30% of working-age Muslims are unemployed,
compared to the national average of approximately 10 %. As one unemployed FrenchMuslim teen complained, " ... they reject the job application because of the name,
Abdullah or ISInail ... " (Young, French & Muslim). More Muslim students enter the
technical/vocational school track in high school than the university track. Their job
qualifications are thus largely unskilled. The high level of unemploYlnent and its social

...

..

causes contribute to feelings of alienation atnong young Muslims .
Unemployment and poor living conditions combine to help foster feelings of
animosity in young French Muslinls toward nlainstream French society, which in turn
creates French stereotypes about radical Muslims. The disillusioned and frustrated young

.
..

..
..
...

Muslim population is a prime target for radical Islamists to gain a foothold in France. As
these groups, like the Algerian Armed Islamic Group, increase their support anlong
younger people in Muslinl neighborhoods, they incite their followers to conl1nit
subversive acts in the name of [slatn or their home country's politics. An extreme but rare
case is the exanlple of the 1995 Paris subway bonlbings carried out by a group of
alienated young Musliln men who were recruited by the Algerian Arnled Islamic Group .

-

..
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This terrorist action was linked to the Algerian civil war. and it was tTIade possible in part
by the alienation of the young Muslim men vulnerable to radical groups (Hunter &
Leveau 15). Other Muslinl groups in France also had a hand in this event~ but in a

-

..
..
..

positive role; they helped calm the Muslim population to prevent further violence after
the bonlbings .

Muslim Organizations and Political Involvement in France
Ethnic~

cultural, and political diversity among those practicing Islanl in France

contribute to a fragmented Muslim population, who cannot unite under the auspices of
one organization or gain much political parity or social representation. Although there is

-

no one representati ve organization recognized by MuslilTIs, such as the Vatican and its
emissaries for Catholics, there are many Muslim groups and organizations in France, with
varying religious practices and beliefs. According to Shireen Hunter and Remy Leveau,

..

editors of Islam, Europe's Second Religion, Muslim institutions can be grouped into
three nlain categories: 1) those developed around

mosques~

2) umbrella organizations

regrouping smaller institutions; and 3) organizations associated with political parties or
Islamic nl0venlents of the inll11igrants' native countries (11). The Paris mosque is

..

..

-

...
...

categorized under the first group, although it is associated with Algeria (it was built by
the French to honor Maghrebi help during World War I), and some Muslinls of other
ethnic origins discount its leadership. Several umbrella organizations are influential
among certain Muslim groups in France. L 'Union des Organisations Islamiques de
France (UOIF), or the Union of Islamic Organizations in France, has a moderate
fundamental ideology similar to that of the Muslinl Brotherhood, an anti-secular

.
.
..
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organization that prolnotes a conservative interpretation of the Qur 'an. It is an umbrella
organization for some 200 associations. Le Con$'eil Franc;ais des Cultes Alu,\'ulmanes
(CFCM), on the other hand, is a Muslim organization established in 2003 as a
representative body to the French government. Nicolas Sarkozy in particular, then
Minister of the Interior, advocated CFCJvl as a means for Muslims to gain political
representation (Kramer 67). However, because the CFCM is a French-government

..

-

-

-..

sponsored institution whose leader, Dalil Boubakeur, is a senior imam of the Paris
Mosque with ties to Algeria, not all Muslims recognize CFCM as a legitimate
representative of their religion. While some Muslims are succeeding on the local level -there were more than 100 municipal councilors elected in 2001 (Pauly 41) -- there are
still no Muslim representatives in France's Parliament. As a result of the diversity among
Muslims, no single organization accurately reflects the collective interests of all; with
little success on a national level, Muslinls as a group remain marginalized within French
government and politics.

..

This real diversity of opinion among Muslims is contrasted with French society'S
perception of Muslims as a monolithic bloc, a fundamental group bent on changing

..

everything to their specifications. As practiced in France, the various forms of Islam are

-

and/or as a political tool to regroup alienated young Muslilns around political goals or to

..
.

...

used both as a cultural too], to Inaintain the traditions of and ties to hOlne countries,

distinguish Muslim ethnic identity and heritage fronl the French culture that wants to
asslInilate them. Contrary to French citizens' and tnedias' beliefs and portrayals, which
categorize Muslims as fundatnentalists, Islam in France is practiced in varied ways, for
varying reasons, and with varying levels of conlmitment.

..
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Although Muslims in France are diverse in their application of Islam~ \vith a
variety of purposes~ the majority practice an IslaIn of peace~ not of political and cultural
confrontation. Unlike the French inlage of Muslinls who all support fundanlental Islamic
groups, most Muslims practice a nloderate IslaIn quietly. This traditional Islanl centers on
personally upholding the Pillars of Islam and observing important life milestones such as
birth, marriage, and death. In the latter sense, Muslims are not \vholly different from

-

..

-..
-

..
.

...
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secular Catholics in France who do not regularly attend church but do celebrate important
rites of passage there. The Five Pillars of Islam are salah (prayer). sawm (fasting), hajj
(pilgrimage to Mecca), zakiih (alnlsgiving), and shahada (declaration of faith). Jihad is
comnlonly portrayed in Western media as the fifth pillar that calls for religious wars, but
it is actually a recolnnlendation, not a pillar, that means "effort in the path of God" (Nasr
91). Due to several negative events carried out in the name ofjihad, such as the attacks of
September 11, 2001 in the United States, Westerners tend to associate jihad with Islamic
warfare, though it is more often interpreted by Muslims to mean internal struggle. As a
1994 Sondage IFOP poll suggests many Muslims in France do not strictly adhere daily to
Islamic tenets: "only 31 % of Muslinls in France pray daily and 16%) attend weekly
services" (Pauly 41). In France, Muslims' beliefs range from secular Islam, \vhose
followers liberally adhere to Islamic rituals and adapt to the French legal and political
principles; to conservative Islam, whose adherents observe Islalnic practices while
attempting to live within a secular, republican framework; to fundamental Islam, whose
practitioners strictly observe Islamic principles of the Qur 'an with no liberal
interpretation~

to Islanlists, \vho are fundaillental Muslims with a political agenda (Hunter
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-
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& Leveau 10-11). Among these categories, most Muslims in France practice a

conservative form of Islam that follows the QUI" 'an and respects French mores .
Islam is part of the cultural heritage of many MaghrebL Arab, and African
immigrants in France, in the sanle w-ay that France's palrimoine includes many Catholic
references and holidays. As such, being able to practice Islam in France is not only a
nlatter of faith, but also a question of cultural and ethnic identity. Just as French society
wants to keep current French culture from being changed through the assimilation of
foreigners, so do the Muslim immigrants wish to nlaintain part of their native culture
while living in a markedly different one. Islanl is one way for inlmigrants and those of
foreign origin to maintain ties with their family and honle countries. Given the Muslirn
population's marginalization within French society. practicing Islam is one way to assert
an identity and gain social consideration. As an immigrant from Algeria or Turkey, it is
difficult for the individual to assert his/her ditIerences or rights in the larger society. but
as a member of a Muslim community, he/she has nlore collective power to make his/her
voice heard. Remy Leveau uses the example of the workplace where inlmigrant workers
used Islam as a legitinlate method of collective bargaining power to gain group rights
based on individual interests:
[Muslim] assertion of identity included requests for prayer rooms in the
workplace and adjustment of working hours to allow thenl to worship.
Starting out with spontaneous requests from small groups, Muslims in the
same workplace eventually began acting together to negotiate with
employers and unions about respecting religious practices. which they said
was a matter of human rights. (Leveau 93)
While some might decry this nlethod as collective bullying, one lnust renlember that
Christian traditions, such as letting school out at noon on Wednesdays for students to
attend catechism, are institutionalized within France. It is significant to note that although
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some Muslims may be third-generation imnligrants and legally French citizens, they are
still considered foreigners in France. Faced with a prejudiced French society that
essentializes immigrants and

Muslims~

practicing Islam in France is a means to assert

one's differences from the alienating French society~ as well as a way to find solace and
solidarity in the similarity of other Muslims .
For some Muslims, though, practicing Islanl means more than just asserting
differences or cultural identity. It can also be used as a political tool for outside groups
seeking support in France and internal groups seeking political representation. As
Leveau's example illustrates, Islam can be a way to assert identity and to gain political
rights. As

such~

some Muslims are using Islam as a political rallying point to assemble

marginalized individuals and communities. While Islam as a political tool for
representation is a positive application, others use Islam to further radical, often

-

-...

destructive, agendas. Foreign imams and Islamic teachers have targeted young Muslim
French citizens, who are alienated from and by French society, by "'extol[ling] the virtues
of orthodox Islam and berat[ing] the culture and values of a French society frOin which
they feel excluded" (Pauly 42). The Algerian Armed Islamic Group is one such example;
they recruited young French Muslims to carry out terrorist activities in Paris in 1995.

..

III

-
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Some Muslim adolescents think Osanla Bin Laden "is leading a just battle" (Young,
French, & Muslim).
As a connection to their native countries, Islam can playa role in the interaction
between the French and the inllnigrants. During a 200 I soccer match, in which France
faced Algeria, the field was invaded by people waving Algerian flags, interpreted as an
act of protest against thirty years of failure of France's integration policy (Young, French,

..
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& Muslim). France's islamophobia, as in many other European countries and the United

States, was clearly a factor in France's failure to integrate effectively Muslim immigrants.
although the failure was not directly related to Islam. Thus, practicing Islanl in France is
not solely a religious endeavor, it is also used as a means to assert cultural identity and

..

..

...
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-

..

gain political support.

La Loi Laique

The Language and Politics of the Secular Law
Created July 3, 2003 by President Jacques Chirac, the Stasi COlnmission, headed
by mediator Bernard Stasi, was a temporary board designed to investigate the
applications of French secularity in public schools and provide recommendations on
which the President could act. Of its twenty members, fourteen are men and six are
women, and most are intellectuals with influential status. All but one member was born in
France. Although the President did not formally mention tensions caused by the Islamic

hijab as a reason for forming the commission, it was no doubt part of the impetus,
considering the publicity surrounding l'affaire dufoulard. While the French became
concerned to maintain secularity faced with Muslim hUabs, there had been no such

..

..

-...

debate over whether Sikh turbans violated secularity before the secularity law. Whatever
the hidden political implications of the Stasi Conlnlission. the members met for six
months to discuss the definition of secularity and conduct nearly 100 public and 40
private hearings with religious and political leaders, teachers and principals, social
groups, and individuals about secularity. On December 11, 2003, the Stasi Commission
formally presented its report, comprising twenty-six recommendations, to the President.

..

-
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..
-

-

..
..

-..

24

The recommendations included observing the Jewish holiday Yom Kippur and the Arabic
holiday Eid al-Kabir in state schools, developing a pedagogical approach to teaching the
world's religions as aspects of civilization, developing a national higher education
institute for Islamic Studies, and offering substitutes for the traditional pork and fish
served on Fridays in schools, in addition to banning conspicuous religious symbols in
public schools. Having claimed that "secularity is not negotiable," President Chirac
waited for the Conlmission's report before enacting a law.
Of the twenty-six recommendations to amend the application of secularity in
France, only the proposition to ban religious symbols in public schools was endorsed as a
legal remedy. According to Commission Inenlber and sociologist Jean Bauberot, the
Commission was created under three contexts: 1) The possibility that a radical Islam
might inlpinge upon civil liberties; 2) gender equity; and 3) the internal crisis of schools
since 1975 (Bauberot, 136-137). His dissention from the recommendation to ban the
h(jab and other religious symbols publicly questioned the Chirac administration's

motives for the secular law as a quick fix. President Chirac defended the decision, saying
"France is an idea of citizenship, an identity forged in the neutral space of public
school. .. Religion is not a subject we inlpose on French children" (Kranler 60 & 62). The
administration deliberated over other recommendations, such as the suggestion to include
Jewish and Islamic holidays in the school calendar. After the decision to relnove
Pentecost as a national holiday, President Chirac clainled that the added holidays "would
create many difficulties for parents who work during those days" (Caldier, Chaverou,
Barral). In the end, the other recommendations were all deemed unnecessary or
inappropriate to be enacted into law. After three lTIonths of debate in Parlement, the
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National Assenlbly voted 494 to 36 and the Senate voted 276 to 20 to ratify the secular
law. On March 15, 2004, the phrase "In the public elementary, junior and high schools,
the act of wearing signs or clothing by which students manifest an ostensible religious
association is forbidden" C"LOI n° 2004-228") was inserted into the education code and
enacted into law. As the law was passed in March and would not become active until the
following September, there was little proof of its efficacy until then .

Results of Rat(fication ofthe Secular Law
During the period between the secular law's enactment and the new school year,
kidnapped French journalists in Iraq brought attention to the Muslim h(jab. In August
2004, Georges Malbrunot and Christian Chesnot were taken hostage in Iraq by the
Islamic Army of Iraq. The fundamentalist group demanded as ransom that France reverse
the ban on Muslim hijabs in schools. Political and religious leaders in France condemned
the action. As the lvew York Times reported, a demonstration of solidarity with the
journalists and the French state gathered several thousand people in Paris shortly after the
journalists were taken hostage (Sciolino). In a move of unity with France, French Muslilll
leaders cautioned outsiders to keep out of the issue of religious symbols. Not wanting to
be seen as supporting radical Islamists, some of the Muslilll groups lessened their protests
against the law. Despite repeated threats by the Islatnic Army of Iraq to execute the
journalists if the law was not revoked, France refused to let the group interfere with the
new law's enforcement. Malbrunot and Chesnot were freed in December 2004, but the
law remained. In spite of the fundamentalist group's denlands, the hostage situation
seemed to create a sense of solidarity among the French, transcending cultural and
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religious ties to relnain unified against terrorists. Perhaps partly as a result, the beginning
of the school year 2004 was relatively calnl .
Despite dire predictions by some, the start of the school year 2004, after the
enactment of a ban on religious synlbols, passed without much fanfare. Officials for the
city of Lille, which contains a large Muslim population, reported that 5-10 % fewer girls
came to class wearing the hUah. Several girls did wear the

h~jab

as a symbolic protest

against the law (Sobocinski 4). Given the statistics that only a few hundred girls wear the
Muslim h~jab out of six million students attending French public schools, the loi lalque is
not affecting the majority of students directly. As the school year progresses, though,
there have been several objections to the law and its vague wording. Among the
dissenters, those who practice the Sikh faith have belatedly voiced their opinion, as the
traditional turban is now defined under French law as a conspicuous symbol. Since the
start of classes, the French government has issued a statement claitning that it would
readjust the law to respect other religions.

Muslim Reactions to the Secular Law
Muslim reactions to the head scarf debate and the secular law are generally
unfavorable but not militant. Several Muslinl groups organized public protests in Paris

...

before and after the law was passed. The leader of the Union des Organisations

..

lslamiques de France (UOIF), Fouad Alaoui, called for a suspension of the law after the

...

..
...

French journalists' kidnapping, but the French government remained firm in its decision
(Kramer 67). Salda Kada, co-author of L'Une voilee, l'autre pas, defended the

h~iab

before the Stasi Commission, saying "This is a debate that belongs in the Muslim
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community~

not to be decided by the French state. This is a divine

prescription'~

(Brenner

196).

Despite the unfavorable reaction of the

majority~

some practicing Muslims or

those from Muslim backgrounds have come forward to defend secularity in France.
Amirouche LaYdi, deputy mayor of Suresnes, a town just west of Paris, favors prohibiting
headscarves in public schools: "It is in the schools that we develop critical thinking

skills~

and one cannot learn that with a veil'~ (Ternisien 10). Yet he does not feel that the issue is
sufficiently large to warrant a law, since it concerns only a few hundred girls as opposed
to the tens of thousands of Muslims and other groups who are discriminated against in
France. Fadela Amara is president of Ni Pules Ni

Soumises~

a feminist organization that

helps inner-city Muslim women gain some autonomy outside their family. She has had
many opportunities to witness the oppressive uses of the hUah. In her mind, "the veil has
no religious connotation. It is the seal of women's humiliation" (Amara). Amara does not,
however, favor a law banning hUahs, since that stigmatizes Muslims. Instead, she
suggests a government pamphlet with guidelines that state the rules of secularity in
schools and specify acceptable behavior.
Leaders from moderate Muslim

cOllntries~

such as President Mubarak of Egypt,

stated that the ban was particular to the French context and did not condemn it. The
traditional Muslim group the Muslinl

Brotherhood~

based in

Egypt~

issued statements

strongly opposing the ban. Tantawi, the Grand Sheikh of the well-known Muslim

..

theological school AI-Ahzar in Cairo, issued a statenlent permitting Muslinl girls in
France to remove their hUahs in order to respect the laws of the country ("Mubarak").
Mufti

-

Tantawi~

whose role for some Muslims is siluilar to that of the Catholic

Pope~
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allowed for the different context of the hUah in France and stated that different rules
apply to Muslims in non-Muslim countries, where the hUah may be seen as a religious
symbol rather than a form of personal worship .

Orientalism in France
The Origins of Contemporary Orientalism

...

..

..
...

Since scholar Edward Said published Orientalism in 1978, Orientalisn1 has been
an important tool for those attempting to analyze the West's interaction with the East
"Orientalism" refers to "the idea of European identity as a superior one in comparison
with all the non-European peoples and

cultures~'

(Oriental ism, Said 134). In effect, the

Occident creates stereotypes of the Orient as homogenous, exotic, and backward in
relation to the West The current secularity debate in France illustrates this Orientalist
attitude, as the French media and governnlent tend to portray Muslim women and girls
who wear the hUah as oppressed. In luuch the same way that Europe di fferentiated itself
from the Orient through Orientalism to justify its imperialist politics, Europe now

-

differentiates itself from the Islam within its borders using the political dogma of
secularity to justify its cultural hegemony over Muslims. An analysis of the semiology of

I 'affaire du foulard in France, in which wonlen wearing the hUab are viewed as
"unenlightened," reveals France's Orientalisnl in its interactions with Muslim
populations.

-.
-

Said examines the origin of Orienta list discourse during Europe's empire building
period of the nineteenth century_ Orientalist discourse retlects an image of Europe more
than of the Orient, for "Orientalisn1 is

and does not simply represent

a considerable

-
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dinlension of nl0dern political-intellectual culture. and as such has less to do with the
Orient than it does with 'our' [Occidental] world" (Orientalisln, Said 138). Occidental
scholars constructed an image of the Orient in the nineteenth century more in keeping
with their perceptions of the Orient than with actual intellectual or physical experience .
Even the geographical classification of the Orient, as one vast region to the east of
Europe, suggests a definition that demarcates more clearly what is European than what is
Oriental. While Europe is no longer directly involved in colonization. Orientalist attitudes

-

..

do sometimes emerge when Europe interacts with peoples to the east and south.
Contemporary Oriental ism is Inanifest in the way the media tends to portray "the
Arab" as a fundanlentalist, Inisogynistic terrorist with a hatred of Western culture. Said
highlights this media tendency in Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts

..

Determine How We See the Rest of the World: '''For the general public in Anlerica and
Europe today, Islam is 'news' of a particularly unpleasant sort. The media, the
government, ... [speaking about] Islam are all in concert: Isiain is a threat to Western
civilization .... negative images of Islam continue to be very much more prevalent than

-

any others ... "(144). The Western media has focused heavily on the religious zealotry of
terrorists who act in the nanle of Islam, so much so that anyone watching major news
channels might get the impression that all Muslims are fanatics. An article, entitled

till

-..

..

"Islamistes: Ia France menacee,,2, published in the French magazine

=-==-=+=-=..::::.:::.

immediately after the September 11 attacks in the United States illustrates this negative
portrayal of the 'Islamists' : "'Internationally, the nebula of Allah's crazy men has bases
throughout Europe. Several plans for attack on the Hexagon's soil have been outwitted.
Here is how these networks were identified" (Pelletier and Pontaut). While not every
"Islamists: France Threatened"
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media outlet portrays Arabs and Muslims from an Orientalist perspective. media
coverage tends to represent Muslims in the Middle East froin a European perspective .
Rather than include footage of events from native Middle Eastern sources like Al-Jazeera
news channel, Western media shoot their own footage and interpret it through their own
cultural perception, lending a subjective and one-sided interpretation to a seemingly
objective report. The manner in which Occidental media tend to cover Islam typifies the
Orientalist thinking that appears in contenlporary French culture .

L 'affaire dufoulard in France exemplifies contemporary French Orientalism. In
October 1989 three Muslinl girls were expelled from their Creil middle school for
refusing to remove their h~jab. This expulsion sparked a public opinion debate on the
limits of secularity in public schools, a debate continued in the media. In 2003, sisters
Alma and Lila Levy were expelled for the same reason. 'rhis expulsion also gained much
media coverage, due in part because their father. whose heritage is Jewish, defended their
decision. In effect, Muslim girls who wear the hUah have beconle the unwilling symbols
of French Orientalism. During the start of the school year 2004. for example. journalists
monitored closely how the Muslinl girls, rather than the general student body, were
reacting to the secular law.

AUf{~lie

Sobocinski's September 4, 2004 article in Le Monde

is one such example of how the media targeted Muslim girls; the journalist presented
only one Muslim girl's thoughts during the first school day as she had to remove her
hijab, thereby portraying her as the representative of Muslin) girls. However true the

..

claims of oppression may be for some Muslim women, the French media perspective
tends to portray n)ost Muslim women as oppressed, which illustrates the homogenizing

-..
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effect of Oriental ism. The question is not so much whether Muslinl wotnen are
oppressed~

...

...
..
...
...

-

but rather how the French public and governnlent feel they should relnedy it.

The French government operates under the assunlption that the conspicuous
absence of religion~ a founding principle of the French Republic, is more progressive for
the community than an overt proclamation of faith, such as wearing a Muslim hUah. In
maintaining its belief that religion is a private matter, the French government has also
ruled out the possibility of new interpretations of the secular laws. Given the unequal
attention to hijahs as opposed to other religious symbols like crosses, Orientalist attitudes
appear to be partly behind the rationale for the law.
Even without the problems that Islam presents to secularity, France ren1ains a
fiercely secular state that relegates religion to private life, away from public scrutiny.
French secularity originated in French citizens' sincere attempts, beginning with the
French Revolution and continuing into the twentieth century, to din1inish the Catholic
Church's domination over public life during the Ancien Regime. As such, French
secularity strives to maintain equality and is not an inherently racist system. However,
after the legislation separating Church and State in the early twentieth century, it was not
until the headscarf debate that French leaders questioned religious symbols in public

..

schools; Sikh boys have worn turbans in French schools without the threats of expulsion

...

stereotypes, but that Frances government has reacted in an Orientalist manner to the

that Muslim girls faced. This is not to say that every French citizen harbors Orientalist

problems of maintaining secularity in schools. Faced with diverging definitions of
religion as public or private, the government chose to retain its definition of secularity

...

....

rather than redefine secularity to adapt to the situation. The rhetoric of the headscarf
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debate tends to define French culture as enlightened and/or progressive in contrast to the
unenlightened and/or backward MuslilTI culture. The context of Oriental ism in France has
thus become to maintain the French cultural status quo against societal transformations
brought about by Muslims and one of the vehicles to do so is the headscarf debate .

Orientalist Stereotypes about the H(jab in France

Although there is little information on the ethnic origins of the French

population~

due to the French belief in universalism 3~ an anti-Muslim attitude does exist in France .
According to a study published by the Commission Nationale Consultative des DraUs de
I 'Homme (CNCDH), there exists in France "an inational fear and total rejection of Islam

at once as a religion, lifestyle, communitarian project, and culture" (Zappi 11). This
French cultural attitude against those who practice Islam sOITIetillles takes the fornl of
hostility toward the 11uslim hUab, a visible symbol of adherence to Islam. The
stereotypes have emerged in France in the past decade that Muslim women who wear the
hijab are oppressed, forced into arranged marriages, forbidden to talk to men, and

generally undervalued by the cOITImunity. Certainly such extreme cases do exist as was

..
..
..
..

..

..

the case of Sohane Benziane, a Muslim girl who was burned alive by a Muslim boy
allegedly seeking revenge against Sohane's boyfriend (Brenner 199). However, not all
MuslilTI women live under such oppressive conditions .
The two major stereotypes of Muslim wonlen perpetuated in France are first, that
the hUab is a symbol of inequality between the sexes because the women are forced by
men to wear it, and second. that the hUab hides a politico-religious fundamentalist

3 In keeping with the French universalist belief that one is French if living in France, the national census
surveys do not ask questions about ethnic origin. Thus, the statistics of ethnicity in France differ.
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agenda. The former stereotype is the more prevalent reason behind the French secular
law, as it runs counter to the belief that the French public school environment should be
maintained as a neutral space free from inequalities. The latter inlage is less prevalent,
but it surfaces after events linked with fundamental Islanl. such as the 1995 Paris subway
bombings. Mainstream French culture typically portrays Muslim women and girls as

...

...
...

oppressed by their male relatives who dogmatically adhere to the Qur 'an, and the h~jab is
seen as the external symbol of this oppression. Some claim that Muslim women are being
forced by their fathers or husbands to decline health care because they cannot be treated
by a female (Chartier). Even the members of the Stasi Commission hold to the idea that
the hijab is a symbol of women's oppression, stating in section 4.2.2.1 of the repo11 that
"the familial and social environment [of ~1usliln women] sonletimes imposes upon them

..

choices which were not their own. The Republic cannot remain deaf to the cry of distress
of these young girls" ("Le Rapport" 23). Using these assumptions, based on more than
one hundred interviews, the Stasi Commision included among its recomnlendations a ban

..
...
...

..
...

..
...

on conspicuous religious synlbols, specifically the Muslim

h~jab.

Certainly Muslim

women are not the only citizens subject to violence in France, yet the secular law does
not attempt to decrease domestic violence in French homes. Instead, it seeks to decrease
the public display of the hijab, a supposed symbol of oppression and violence.
The general French population has thus seized upon the Muslim hijab as a symbol
of women's inequality and Islam's presence in France. but such an attitude, based on
stereotypes, denies individual Muslim women the agency to choose what to wear and the
privilege of explanation. Muslim women are essentialized
others for the entirety of their reasons for wearing the

h~iab

one explanation is given by
and overlooked. However,

-

-
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if one asks individual Muslim women why they wear the veil, oppression is only one
possible explanation among many.

Feminism and Women in Islam

"Heaven lieth at the feet a/mothers"
Wearing hijab, a physical indicator of worship, is but one way in which Muslim
wonlen practice their faith. Islam teaches respect for others, and many MuslilTIS cite its
guidelines as a significant support in life. Western media tend to broadcast negative
images of women perpetuated by a relative few fundamentalist Muslims, such as women
in burqas under the Taliban. Classical Islam, the Islam practiced during and directly after
Prophet MuhamlTIad's death, portrays a much more positive image of women.

..
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Woman is considered sacred in Islam. '''Heaven lieth at the feet of mothers~' is one
of Prophet Muhammed's famous hadiths, or sayings. As George Washington University
Professor of Islamic Studies Seyyed Hossein Nasr states in his book [slam: Religion,
History, Civilization: "Islam sees the role of the two sexes in their complementarity
rather than their opposition. The role of women is seen primarily but not exclusively as
preserving the family and bringing up the children and that of men as protecting the
fanlily and providing economically for if' (68). Family is the cornerstone of the Muslim
community, and nlothers (as well as wives and sisters), as impOltant figures who preserve
the family, are considered sacred for this purpose. In addition to a lifestyle that respects
women, Islam provides guidelines for dress and behavior.
Literally translated in Arabic, 'hijab' means ""protection and covering." As
Islamic tradition interprets it, hijab refers to a full body garb that fulfills the injunction by

35
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the Prophet to dress modestly. This injunction applies equally to men and women, though
men do not wear hUab. Each culture interprets the injunction according to its own
traditions, so that Muslims in China may wear a headscarf over the traditional cheongsam
dress, while Muslims in America may wear jeans with their h~jab. Islamic law scholar

III
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Mohammad Ali Syed contends that the hUab developed from the specific practices of the
Prophet's wives and was not directed to all Muslim women. During Muhammad's life,
"she took the veil" meant the woman became the wife of the Prophet. Syed hypothesizes
that "the combined result of veiling prevailing among the non-Muslim in the conquered
territories and the acceptance of the Prophet's wives as rote models may have contributed
to the general adoption of the custom of veiling among Muslim women" (109). In
addition to models of dress, Muhanlmad's wives were role models for practitioners of
Islan1 who played an integral role in the early propagation of the religion.
Contrary to Western images of isolated Muslim women, Muhammad's entourage
included many intelligent women who helped spread his word. Khadlja, his first wife,
was a local merchant fifteen years his senior. In an independent spirit that most Western

III

women do not practice even today, it was she who proposed marriage to him. Historical
accounts of their marriage indicate that it was a happy and monogamous one.

Khad~ja

III!

was one of the first converts to Islam and she supported Muhan1mad during the titne of

...

..

his revelations from Allah when others in the community began to reject hin1. After
Khad~ja's

death, Muhammad did contract polygamous lnarriages, which Nasr clainls

"were for political reasons, to unite various tribes within the Islamic community" (52).
III

These polygamous marriages also served to provide protection for women widowed by

...

war. As close meillbers of the family, Muhammad's wives were in privileged positions to

..

..

-

-..
..
..

.
..
..

36

gather and preserve the Prophet's words. Writer Assia Djebar asserted in Loin de Medine
that Muhanlmad's wives were thus early Islamic scholars, although history would dismiss
many of their testimonies as inaccurate.
The figure of woman as sacred in Islam and the important roles the first Muslim
women played in their religion conlbine to create a powerful inlage of women. Although
cultural practices have lessened the early Muslim women's role in the religion, there
remains a tradition of strong women. Given the historical inspiration, then, is there today
an Islamic feminisnl?

Is there an Islamic feminism?
As with any label or category, the terms "feminisnl" and "feminist" encompass
many, sometimes contradictory, definitions. Feminism includes various activities and
beliefs, and is not litnited to actions that directly and aggressively challenge the status

.
..
..
..

..

-

quo. In fact, it is quite difficult to categorize all actions purported to improve women's
status as solely feminist, since the activists may have had other motives and messages in
mind. In other words, fenlinism does not have a straightforward definition agreed upon
by everyone; thus it is difficult to extract consciously feminist intentions from other
cultural or political agendas. One must be especially careful in applying the term to
Muslim women, as feminism has become a Western construct over the course of the
twentieth century. Sonle Muslim wOInen eschew the term because they do not want to
align themselves with the West even if they engage in what could be labeled feminist
activities. The initial question, "Is there an Islatnic feminism?" must therefore be

.
..
..
..
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dissected into its individual meanings and reformulated. A better question is: '''Are there
people who observe Islamic principles and strive to help women?"
Before analyzing the question, it is necessary to explain some associations
Muslims have with feminism. Contacts between cultures and among those calling

-..

thenlselves feminists can bring misunderstanding about feminism as much as unity of

..
..

force women to remove their veils (Alloula 43). In Egypt, then, what the citizens know of

-

shared ideas. The British colonizers in Egypt. the same ones who vehemently opposed
feminism in England, distorted feminist rhetoric in order to dominate the culture and

the term feminism originates with their disdainful treatment at the hands of their
colonizers, even if feminist-like ideas had existed under other labels. During the
mediatized fenlinist movements of the 1960s, feminism became almost synonymous with
refusing the status quo and anything that wonlen did not want to do. The media portrayed
exaggerated inlages of feminists who labeled as backward any woman who wanted to be

...

..
..

a wife and mother instead of work outside the hOITIe. For Muslims, whose religion
encourages community cooperation, such an individualistic rhetoric seems to run counter
to their communal worldview. These examples of cultural hegemony, along with many
others, have created an inlage of feminism as a Western

idea~

one that SOine Muslims

claim has no place in their lives.
Feminism encompasses many different definitions, and these definitions vary

..
..
...
...

depending on culture. The question "Is there an Islamic feminism?" inlplies in some way
that Muslims are a group unified around their religion. While MuslitTIS may experience a
feeling of solidarity with other Muslims, it is false to claim that everyone who practices
Islam holds the same beliefs and values. There is no unity of identity for Muslims, much
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less a unified definition of Muslim feminism. An Egyptian feminist defines her feminism

-

.
..

-

-

differently than an Algerian fenlinist, who defines her fenlinisnl differently from a French
feminist. In order to answer the question, one must first analyze individuals to determine
how their beliefs do or do not embody feminist thinking .
There are many diverse examples of MuslitTI WOlllen who work toward change .
As Miriam Cooke, Duke Professor of Arabic, defined it in her book Women Clainl Islam,
feminists are "women who think and do something about changing expectations for
women's social rules and responsibilities" (ix). The following examples describe several
Muslim women who are re-defining aspects of Islam, in the process defining feminism
among those who practice Islam.

..

Fatinta Mernissi
With her book The Veil and the Male Elite, Moroccan sociologist Fatima
Mernissi boldly challenges the long-held Muslim belief that Prophet Muhammad claimed
"Those who entrust their affairs to a woman will never know prosperity." Mernissi

..

refutes the claim that these words originate with the Prophet, instead directing attention to
one of his followers who clainled only after the Prophet's death to have heard the Prophet
utter this remark. Her analysis of early Islam portrays a religion that provides for the

..

physical and spiritual welfare of all, including women.

Assia Djebar
Algerian author Assia Djebar re-interprets Islamic history of Prophet

..

-

Muhammad's life through women's perspectives in her historical novel Loin de Medine .
In addition to several forgotten heroines or 111isinterpreted villains of Islam, Djebar
depicts Muhammad's wives and his daughters. As Djebar describes them, the wives
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..

-

-..
..
..

served as counselors, who, rather than being marginalized and

helped to shape

the new Islamic community. Djebar has written other books in which female characters
address issues surrounding being a woman and a Muslim, such as Vaste est la prison, in
which a Muslim woman recounts her life during and after colonization in Algeria.

Irshad Manj i
As a refornl Muslim, or a Muslinl who calls for liberal-thinking reform in [slam,
journalist Irshad Manji works to change contemporary thought about Islatn. In her book
The Trouble with Islam, Manji advocates a return to the liberal Musliln societies of
earlier centuries that promoted (itihad, or the Islamic tradition of independent thinking.
Rather than sitting complacently by while a fundamentalist few tarnish Islam's name in
the world, Manji promotes "operation ijtihad' to question Islam as a foil to
fundamentalism. She suggests supporting Musliln women entrepreneurs, through
organizations such as the Grameen Bank that gives small loans to village businesses run
by women. As a self-described

-

isolated~

"'refusenik,~'

Manji "refuses to join the army of

automatons of God" (Manji lecture).
Despite exanlples of felninist thinking among some Muslims, other Muslims
specifically reject fenlinism as contrary to the principles of Islam or their cultural
heritage. Haidah Moghissi argues in Feminism and Islamic Fundamentalism that

...

feminism and Islam are incompatible because the former is based on struggles for gender
equality and the latter is founded on gender hierarchy. Moghissi fears that valorization of

-

...

Islamic feminism "highlights only one of the many forms of identity available to Middle
Eastern women ... overshadowing forms of struggle outside religiolls practices and
silencing the secular voices which are still raised against the region's stifling
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..
..

Islamification policies" (qtd. in Cooke 58). Moghissi's concerns, shared by other Muslim
women intellectuals, are not centered so much on fenlinism but rather on the danger of
creating a specifically Islamic felninism that could be co-opted by fundamental religious

...

governnlents to take away women's rights. Other Muslims are weary of feminism as a

-..
-..

contemporary embodiment of Western hegemony that imposes Western ideals and mores

...

onto Middle Eastern cultures, disregarding specific cultural contexts. Regardless of a
similar philosophy of gender equality, the Algerian feminist who is struggling against a
rigid patriarchal system does not have the same experiences or priorities as the greatgranddaughter of French colonizers who demands equal rights. While alnl0st everyone is
opposed to clitoradectomy, it is much easier for an American fenlinist, who has never
faced such a prospect, to denounce it than it is for a Cameroonian feminist, for whom the
practice is also part of her heritage (Cooke 123).
Certain Muslim women claim that wearing the h(jab is one action similar to
feminist liberation. Some Musliln traditions describe the h(jab' s purpose as preserving
woman's beauty for her husband and family, rather than allowing a perhaps undeserving

..

stranger to look at her body. In this way, the hUab or veil allows women to transcend the
physical construction of gender by removing thenlselves from the lnale gaze. As
described in feminist theory, the male gaze acts to render a woman as an object to be
looked at in a world where all subjects are male. Rather than being a slave to fashion in
the Western world, where women are expected to nlake themselves attractive to any

..

passers-by they might meet, Muslim women who wear the h(jab reject this attitude.
However, detractors of the h(jab and veil cite its ability to attract attention. According to
author Nawad EI Saadawi, the veil draws attention to the body by denying the male gaze,

..

..
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-

thus increasing curiosity about the exotic body that lies beneath and sinlultaneously
veiling the woman's nlind (Cooke 133).
In answering the question of Islamic feminists, then, one must take into account
cultural and religious diversity, as well as individual activities. If one extends Miriam

-

-

Cooke's definition of feminism~ it could also be added that feminists are women who
work or think about changing other cultures' perceptions of wonlen. In this context~
Muslinls who champion a beneficial cause for women, even if she/he champions the
hijab for beneficial reasons, are considered feminist. Although the Western nledia tend to

portray Muslinls as culturally unprogressive and backward, in opposition to the
progressive and liberal ideas of Western culture, certain practitioners of Islam also

-

practice feminism. Although they Inay reject the label, Muslim women who strive to
redefine and improve culturally ascribed roles for women in Islam and/or correct Western
stereotypes about Muslim women are practicing Islamic fenlinism. 4

..

-

Unveiling the Veil: Individual Women's Stories about Islam
Why do some Muslim wonlen wear the hUab while others do not? What does the
hUab mean to each Muslim woman? The nledia debate does not allow for such questions,

nor does it allow a diverse range of wonlen to speak. In this context, a woman's
explanation would not be heard even if she offered it. Her words would be interpreted
according to the politically correct association with the

..
..

-

h~iab,

depending on the culture.

Thus, though there may be a plethora of images of Muslim "lomen, and some Muslim
women's voices are quoted, the majority of Muslim women are ignored in Western nledia
In order to dispel the Western myth that all Muslims have misogynistic attitudes, I found it necessary to
use a Western label. I do not mean to assign imperiously to these women a label they reject, but rather to
demonstrate to Western audiences that some Muslims do strive to help women.
4
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..

and national cultures as unable to speak for thenlselves in their politically ascribed role as
subaltern. Considering that Muslims constitute over one billion people in the world, and
women are one-half of that population. wonlen who practice Islanl have many diverse
experiences to share. Here are a few of their stories. 5

-

T, originallyfrom the Democratic Republic of the Congo
The Democratic Republic of the Congo is a former Belgian colony in central

..
..

-...
-

Africa. Although the official language is French, other African languages and dialects,
such as Swahili and Lingala, are widely spoken. Catholics are the majority religion
although approximately 100/0 of the population is Muslinl ('"Congo"). The country was
granted independence from BelgiU111 on June 30, 1960, though political in-fighting has
resulted in a state of insecurity. Given the post-colonial context, T. 's experiences do not
directly relate to the French secular law. However, practicing Islam in a non-Muslim,
French-speaking former colony, T. 's experiences can give insight into the variety and
heterogeneity of perspectives in Islanl. T. is in her early twenties.
As a Muslim in the non-Muslitll Democratic Republic of the Congo, T.
encountered stereotypes and adversity. She attended a private Catholic schoot because it
was the best in the city, but not all of her family agreed with her parents' decision: '''It
was okay for me [because] Illy parents wanted nle to go and it was the best school in the
city. My family, like my father's sisters and brothers, were like 'That's not right, you

..
--

..

shouldn't let your kids go to this school, [because] it's not Muslim,' but the Muslim
schools were even more expensive than the Catholic school, and they weren't any good
5

As expatriates living in the United States. these women may have different perspectives from
Muslim women living in their respective countries where values can differ from those in America .
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[because] they just taught the Qur 'an over there. But the Catholic schools were better for
me. My sister even got baptized, in the Catholic school [and she still practices Islam]." T.
does not seem as if she minded attending a Catholic school, but she did not tell the school
officials when she observed the Islamic holidays: "You don't have to tell them because

...

-...
..

-

you'll have problems with the head of the school, stuff like that. [If] there was a prayer,
everybody comes to school and goes to church, you have to go to. Because you didn't tell
anybody that you were Muslim. And even if they know you're Muslim, even if there's a
prayer, just pray like everybody else, stay quiet." T. claims it was not that bad living in a'
non-Muslim country, but she still experienced some prejudice due to ignorance: "The
biggest problem was our neighbors, [because] when we put incense on the door for
Ramadan and pray, people see it and they're like 'OK, these people are, like, weird.
They're like witches or something' and they wouldn't even come near our house because
they were scared. They think if they do something bad to you, you're gonna pray to your
god and then something bad's gonna happen. It was something they were scared of." T.
lived in Cameroon, a predominantly Muslim country, for a short time, and I ask her if she

...

was treated differently there: "Um ... you can get treated differently [than] in the Congo,
because most of the people there [Cameroon] are Muslim, so over there it's normal.
When it's Ramadan, everybody is fasting, and in the market you see everybody selling
the kind of food you eat during Ramadan. Over there it's normal, where in [my

..

hometown] it's weird."
T. does not wear the hijab. She claims it is a personal decision whether or not to
wear the hijab, and based on family tradition. '"My mom Llsed to wear them, but not all

..

-

the time because in lny family it's not an obligation to wear it. You wear it when you

..

-

..

-

..

...
...
...

..

..

-

-

..

-

-

..
..
-

-
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want to, or on Fridays when you go to pray at the nlosque. But it's not a family tradition,

..

and in the Congo it's hot. It's your choice to wear it." T. expands on the hijab as a choice
when explaining the reasons why some people wear the hijab to mosque and others wear
it all the time: "I have an aunt who wears hers all the time. She chooses it [because] she
thinks it nlakes her a better person. She knows that she doesn't have to but she wants to.

..
-

So, I think it's her choice, and if she thinks she wants to wear it, she can."
When asked if she ever thought the htiah or veil could be oppressive in any
situation, T. replies no. "Unless it's something you have to do, ordered by the state like in
Iran, countries like that. ... But I don't think they are oppressed because they want to wear
it too. Because if they didn't want to they would get out of the country, do something not

-

to wear it, but I think they want to." I explain that especially in the West, there is a
stereotype that Muslitn women are oppressed because they wear the htiah or veil. "Yeah,
it depends on traditions too. In our tradition. our grandmothers didn't wear the veil, ... But
in Iran you see that the great-grandmother. she wore the veil. so everybody wants to do
the same thing because it's a tradition." I then ask if there are any Western practices
regarding women that she thinks oppressive, giving the exanlple that another Muslim

..

woman had told me of the custom of married women taking their husband's name. T .
does not think any Western customs were oppressive, but talks about the marriage
custom, "I like the way my mother, when she married my father, she didn't have to take
his name. So she has her own name. and when we got here [United States] to get Social
Security cards, the people were like. 'OK, why don't you have the same name as your

...

-

-

husband?' and she was like, 'I wanted to keep Iny own name.' And they were looking at
her like she was weird or something. But I think it's her choice, if she wants to keep her
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name she can keep it. You don't have to take your husband's name to prove you are

..

married. It's your own choice."
As for the French secular law, T. does not agree with the rationale behind it. "I
think people have to make their own choices. Wearing the veil doesn't make people

-

..

-

terrorists, because not everybody thinks the same. So if somebody wants to put bombs
under the rail to kill all the people and thinks that's how God is going to thank her, it's not
the same way that everybody is thinking. I don't think that it's right to prevent people
from doing what they want or think is right." 1fT. wore a hUab in France, she asserts that
she would not remove it, even if it meant expulsion: '"There are many other schools. I'd
just pick another one."

N, originally from Yemen and lived ten years in France 6

-

Yemen is situated below Saudi Arabia, and the predominant ethnic group is Arab.
Islam is the majority religion, but there are small numbers of Jewish, Christian, and
Hindu groups. Although Yemen is not a French-speaking country, N. moved to France at
age 15 when her father became an anlbassador. She lived and studied in Paris with her
parents until she married at 24 years of age. N. does not wear the

h~jab.

N. is in her late

twenties.

..

-...
-

N. 's descriptions of Islam reveal how her faith guides her life. As N. recounts,
"We always say that the Islam that we know, it's not simply reading the Qur 'an, going to
mosque, praying, no. Islam is also working with others, evaluating yourself, doing
sonlething that could help others in society. That is to say, if I want to stay home, I don't
want to help others. Whereas if I go study at university, I'ln going to work, I will become
6

Interview translated from French. All translations are my own.

..
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a professor, I will teach others, this is going to help them discover other parts of life, and
maybe other paths in life. That is really the principle of Islam. Doing good for others and
improving

yourself~

because we cannot do things in one single direction. It is for and with

the other."
In talking about Islam, N. also frequently mentions her family as another

..

-

foundation in her life and her faith. When her father becanle ambassador, she followed
her parents to France, because "'in the Arab countries, daughters follow their parents."
Her parents instilled in her the foundations of Islam: "We learn from the family how to
respect the aspects of Islam that we really cannot ignore. Like prayer, for example."
However, different families have different traditions, so N. practices Islam according to

...

-

her family's traditions, such as praying at home rather than at a mosque: "I am in a family
where the women do not go to the mosque. My mother did not go, she prayed at home, as
I grew up [ saw my mother doing certain things, so I do the same things. My father went
to mosque on Fridays, because it's an obligation for the Inen to pray at the mosque at
midday." When her family moved to France, N. says she did not feel very different

...

practicing Islam there. As it was not family tradition to go to mosque, N. did not go in
France. The only thing that was truly different in France was "during the religious
holidays, we found ourselves alone with our immediate fatnily members. It's not like in
Yemen, where the extended family and everyone celebrated."
As N. explains, the stereotype of Muslim women forced into arranged marriages
is totally untrue in her case. She met her husband in France and had a five-year
engagement while he studied in the U.S. As she asserts, "They say that Muslinl women
are not allowed to meet their husbands ... That's totally false. I knew my husband for five

-

-
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years ... and then I married him after a long history of romance. It was not because my
father or my mother decided for lTIe. Even in the Qur 'an~ they say that God asks lTIen to
give their daughters the right to choose their husbands. They say that our prophet
Muhammad denied a marriage because the girl had not wanted it. There are many

-

families who do this to their daughters. But I find this gives a bad image of Islam, it's not
really Islam. There are people who have problems conforming in Islam and they translate
that in doing things that have nothing to do with Islam, in claiming that it is fact."
In talking about the secular law in France, N. reveals her own thoughts about the

..,

hijab and the law. She is against the secular law, because "I tind it's a personal freedonl, I
should not force others to wear their clothes in a specific fashion. If I respect that person,

..
..

and he/she has done nothing wrong, why force her to renl0ve her hijah, or his cross?"
When I ask her about her understanding of the hijab in Islanl, she replies that it is an
obligation: "Muslim girls must wear the hijab .. .outside the family. Once you are outside,
wearing the hijab is part of the religion, not to show your femininity outside the family.
Frankly, I realize that I should wear the hijah, that it's an obligation. But since my
childhood, ... wearing the hijah was not stressed in my family. So that even now I don't
wear the hijab, despite the fact that I am Muslinl and I practice Islanl. WelL I practice all
the possible aspects of Istanl, but not the

--

h~iab.

The h(iah' s purpose is not to attract

strangers' attention by your femininity. We consider woman's hair and the nape of the
neck part of femininity, that we need to hide and keep for our husbands and own
families." N. then elaborates on the hijab in a cultural sense: "When I was in Yemen for
my marriage, I realized that wearing the hUab was important there. If you know the

..
-

daughter of so-and-so and you see this daughter in the streets without a hijab, it's going

-

-
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to create runlors." N. wore the h(jab in Yemen, but hers did not go to the extreme and
cover her body.
Talking of hfjabs, N. also mentions the stereotypes of veiled Muslim wonlen.
"There is one h(jab that is truly extremist and has nothing to do with Islam. It's what you
see sometimes on TV, women wearing very long, very large things, and covering the
head and face. That is not my Islam. This is a point that is really inlpoltant to specify
because sometimes people mix everything together. There is another h(jab, just wearing

...

-

[something] on your head, and you can wear pants, T-shirts, in ways that don't attract
attention." Due to its importance in Yemen, N. wore the h(jab during her stay, but not in
the extrenle sense with a veil over her head and a long robe covering her body. She
mentions her other friends in Yemen who wear the h(jab, "simply the veil without going
to the extrelne." Given her experiences, N. questions the stereotype that Muslim women
who wear the hijab are oppressed by men: '''I think irs a stereotype created by a few who
don't truly know what religion is, whether it be Islam or Christianity. 'Good Muslim
woman' does not mean that I wear the veil on my head, my face, that I don't go outside

-

with nlen, that I don't work, that I stay at home, that I don't see anyone. This isn't Islanl.
A wonlan in Islam, she goes out, she works, she does what she can to help her man, her
children, her society, but always in respecting herself Because I must respect myself, I

-

respect the man that I have chosen as husband, I respect the society around me. That is
something that some people do not understand, "She is oppressed.' No! She is respected,
and she must respect man, because it is reciprocaL"
After talking about stereotypes of Muslim women, 1 ask N. if she considers any
Western traditions oppressive toward women. N. inlmediately responds yes, citing the

...
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betrayal of women. N. elaborates in particular about lack of respect for women: "It's
normal in Europe that if a woman cannot work, she cannot live. In Islanl, for example, we
don't have that, because the woman, whoever she is, is protected by the family. If I don't

..

work, I won't die of hunger. I will knock on a cousin's door and always be welcome .
This, I am alnlost sure of, is not the case in France. In France, if you don't earn a living,
you die. That is to say that no one is going to take the responsibility. In Muslim countries,

..

-

woman is part of the sacred that we must truly protect by all nleans. I find that admirable
in Islam." I ask if the men are also considered sacred, but N. says no, it all begins with
woman: "In the Qur 'an God says that Heaven lieth under the feet of mothers. It is truly
the elevation of woman in Islanl. It's metaphoricaL that woman is sacred. I nlust respect

-

-

my mother, I must love her, I nlust do all that I can to protect her. It's the mother of
which we speak, it's all women. It's the mother, the sister, the daughter."
Finally, I ask N. if she would remove her h(;ah if she were a French Muslim
schoolgirl. "No," she says, "it's something between me and my God and I don't want
humans forcing themselves between that relationship." N. would refuse to remove her

-

...

h(jah even if it meant expulsion. However. N. interjects, one of the great Muftis (Islamic

religious leaders) of AI-Azhar schooL has given pernlission to French Muslims to remove
their h(jahs, "because it's a social law that they must respect." It's also a question of
respect for N., "'There are some who say that Islanl doesn't respect others and Mufti
Tantawi explains that this permission to remove the h(jab is because they must respect
the country's laws." This raises the question of Muslinl allegiance to religion or culture,
whether Muslims followed the laws of the countries in which they lived or the Islamic

..
..

laws coming fronl other countries. N. clarifies that with Tantawi, his pronouncements are

...

-

-

-
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applied to Islam: "He explains something across Islam. But if it wasn't son1eone like
Tantawi, I don't think the girls would listen. He gives advice originating from Islan1." N.
elaborates that Islam is not a fixed religion, '''Islan1 must follow the evolution of the
people. This is why Tantawi gave permission. Woman in Islatn must evolve. She must
find her place in society."

A., originally/rom AJorocco 7
Morocco, a country in the Maghreb region, is a former French protectorate. The
country gained its independence in 1956, and its current governtnent is a constitutional
monarchy. i\10rocco's constitution includes an article that proclaims Islam the state

-

religion, with the king as the state's spiritual leader. but everyone is guaranteed the right
to practice his/her own faith. Women in Morocco have had the right to vote since the
early 1960s, and there have been women representatives in Parliament since the 1990s.
A., a Moroccan wOlnan living in the United States, wears the

-

..

_.

h~iah

and is extren1ely

devoted in her faith. Our conversation centers on the differences between cultural and
Islamic traditions, as well as the effects on Muslims of Septen1ber 11. A. is in her thirties.
In describing Morocco's government, A. addresses the differences between
cultural and Islatnic traditions. Morocco's legal system includes the modawana, or the
family code, that "governs the relationship between husband and wife." Although the

modawana "draws from the principles of Islam, it is not 100% Islamic." The shari 'a, on
the other hand, is traditional Islamic law. To make a better distinction between the two,

..

-

A. elaborates using the example of polygamy: "Polygamy is pernlitted in Morocco, and it
is linked to Islam as well. It is not a right acquired for man, just like that. There are
7

Interview translated from French. All translations are my own.

-

-
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paranleters and limits as well. The modawana is still inspired by Islam, but it also
inlposes limits.~' The modawana now requires that a man alert his wife if he wishes to
obtain a divorce. The difference, A. asserts, is that the modawana has added changes to
Islanlic law. In discussing laws affecting nlen, women, and fanlilies, I ask about her
family.
The story of A.' s marriage may evoke ne gat ive associations with forced
marriages, but A. claims that was never the case. She also adds that "I was the only

...

member of my family to be married like that." A.'s family had known her husband's
family for years, so "there was an arrangenlent between families. My father told me that
so-and-so's son was coming to see us. If it worked out, so nluch the better, and if not, too

-

bad. So he came and we talked alone. We saw that we had the same outlook on life and
that we had perhaps the same life objectives, and so we accepted the marriage. It wasn't
love at first sight, it began with mutual

..
..
...

comprehension.~'

Despite the fact that not all

marriages are arranged in Morocco, and that all her cousins "dated" before they were
married, "it is not a subject openly discussed." A. gives the example of her cousin, who
knew her husband before their marriage, "and I also knew him before their marriage .
Sometimes now there will be a nloment when he will say' You remember when?' and tell
sonlething that happened three years before their marriage. Everyone gives him surprised
looks. No one says' I knew him for three years before our marriage,' it is said in other

...

ways."
Although A. accepted her marriage, she does not rule out the possibility that other

-

nlarriages are arranged and forced. Perhaps arranged marriages occur in the countryside,

...

A. says, but "it does not occur in the 111ilieu of educated people." However, A. warns, this

..

..
-

-
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practice is "not at all Islanlic. During the time of the Prophet, a woman came to see him
and told him 'My father married me to this person.' He asked her if she wanted it, and
she said no. So the Prophet said ' You can divorce him. no one is forcing you. ". As A.
asserts, "The 'woman's consent is a condition in the lnarriage contract," but consent can
be given in two ways. When a father asks his daughter if she accepts the marriage, .... if she
is embarrassed to say "yes, he pleases nle.· she can say nothing. It is understood by her
silence that she accepts, because she has shown nothing to the contrary. But a wonlan

-

who has already been married must say yes." Thus, A.'s description of her nlarriage and
those of her family in Morocco illustrates the influences cultural tradition has on Islamic
tradition.

-

-

..

-

The hijab, another Islamic tradition, has been influenced by culture as well. A.
firnlly states that "'the hijab, according to the Qur 'an, is an obligation." A. did not always
wear the

h~iab,

""out of social fear. At home, we regard a veiled woman as antiquated. Ifs

not nl0dern, and modern people dress like the Occidental countries. In my case, you can
combine the two, being modern in my mind and conservative in certain acts." For A.,
donning the hijab was not a quick decision: ·'1 was 22 years old and my fatnily had
decided to go to Mecca rather than to Spain. We were there for two weeks. and since then

...

...

-

-

I no longer take it off. I knew it was an obligation, but I was afraid of losing my friends,
being rejected by my fanlily and my society." A. was the first among her family to wear
the hijab, but soon her mother and certain aunts donned it too. However, A. says that
only ten percent of her family wears it, "but I would never ask why they did not wear it.
It is personal, it is not a conspicuous symbol like they say in France." According to A., "it

-

..

-
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is more than a scarf on your head, it is a cover of the entire body, it is also a cover for
your heart."
Using this definition of religion, then, A. talks about people's reactions to her as a
Muslim after September 11. For her, the
badly because of her

h~jab.

h~jab

is not oppressive, but some people treat her

Islam's image, A. asserts, "has been tarnished these last few

years. There are certain people who know nothing of the religion and who begin to
propagate erroneous ideas. Unfortunately, this is what has happened. Killing innocent

-

people is not Islam at all." Despite people's negative associations with Islam and their

....

she wears the veil, she is like the other Muslims who destroyed us.' I find this

..
..

subsequent treatment of her, A. understands their reaction: "They think "She is Muslim,

understandable, and I forgive their behavior because it is entirely human."
In talking of stereotypes of Muslims, we turn to France's secular law. While A.
does not condone the la\\l, "You need to respect the laws of the country in which you
reside. You are not obligated to be there, it's your choice." The two extreme effects of
this law are that the girls do not go to schooL or they remove their

h~jab.

A. is against

both cases, "If I were a student in France, with the current conditions, [ would have two
choices: either study at home or go to a private school. These laws were voted on, they

..
-

-

..

...

were not arbitrarily thrown in there." However, A. does not approve of the law because
"it is a limit on personal freedom."
In explaining her faith in Islam, A. also explains the principles of any religion .
Religion, A. claims, is like a ladder with different levels. All the religions "are based on
the same principles, to attempt to reach the ideal. Yet this ideal is unattainable. The
further one embarks on discovering Islam or any religion, the lTIOre one tries to reach this

-

-

-
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ideal, the more one connects to the religion, and the more one practices it." Yet there is
no longer a pure

Islam~

as '''people who practice it on a daily basis do not cease to change

it." The hijab is a divine order, but "'now people say "it's not modern to wear it, we don't
want to wear it.'" Islam dates back fifteen centuries, A. declares, "'and now there is a

...

good mix between culture and religion. Each tin1e that a country opens to Islam, the
culture adds to i C'

...

-

Although these women's backgrounds and experiences are diverse, they share
some similar thoughts and experiences. Each WOlnan cites family and cultural traditions
as an important aspect of her life. T., fron1 the Democratic Republic of the Congo,

-

...

explains that family tradition is one determining factor in whether or not a woman wears
the hijab. N., from Yenlen, discusses tradition often when explaining how the family
practices Islam. She, too, mentions the fanlily tradition when explaining why she does not
wear the hijab. A., from Morocco, explains the differences between the tradition of
classical Islam and current cultural religious practices, declaring that stereotypes about

.,

..

-

..
...

..
..

Muslin1s arise from the misunderstandings created when the two are blurred together.
Each woman also addresses stereotypes about Muslims .
As much impact as September II had on the world, its role in perpetuating
stereotypes of Muslims is often neglected in the Western press. During the interviews
each woman addressed negative inlages of Muslims without being prompted. A .
comments on others' negative reactions to her h(jab after September I 1, stressing that
what the hijackers did had nothing to do with her IslaIll. T. referred to the erroneous
American belief that wearing hijab is synonymous with terrorisn1, emphasizing that
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...
...

terrorism is not synonymous with Islam. N. addressed the Western media image of
Muslim women as veiled objects and makes the distinction between wearing the hijab
from extreme acts often associated with the veil. While these women share sinlilar
experiences, their stories are also very different, especially with regard to the hUab.
Of the three women interviewed, only A. wears the hijab whenever she is in
public. For her. the h(jab is a non-negotiable duty required by the Prophet, but she does
not denigrate other women who do not wear the hUah. N. does not wear the hUab, but she
recognizes that she should wear it as part of her religion. T. does not wear the hijab on a
daily basis, only to go to mosque with her mother. T.'s understanding of the hUab centers

-

..

on family tradition and personal choice, rather than on a divine nlandate.
Three different women from different parts of the world have a conlmon link,
Islam. They all share certain similar experiences, especially pertaining to Islam and
stereotypes of Muslinls. Yet each woman has a distinct story to tell, unique to her

..
..

..

..
..
...

..

experience. None of their narratives should be taken to represent all practitioners of
Islam, but each story contributes to the range of experiences in Islam. They all spoke of
the negative stereotypes of Islanl and its

practitioners~

in contributing to this research on

the diversity of Muslitn women they help to contradict those stereotypes.

Conclusion
Western societies have created myths about the oppressed Muslim woman for
years. In doing so, they have also created an ilnplicit dichotomy between the oppressed
Muslim woman and the liberated Western woman. Inherent in this dichotomy is the
assumption that oppression no longer exists in the enlightened Western countries. An
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obvious example of the stereotypes this dichotomy of Inyth inspires is that of the
oppression and subordination of the veiled Muslim woman. In contrast, then, the unveiled
Western woman must be liberated. Another example is the stereotypical Western image
of the Middle Eastern harem as a den of sexual iniquity reserved f'Or one man.
It is a Western assumption that women secluded from men are deprived and
oppressed. While this may indeed be the case for some women, Leila Ahmed refutes the

..

-

..

-

-

-

..
..

ilnage as an absolute by revealing the origins of the harem. In her view, the harem is
interpreted according to two perceptions, "a system that permits males sexual access to
more than one female, ... [or] a system whereby the

f~male

relatives ofa man share much

of their time and their living space" (524). While the Western myth tends to ignore the
explanation of harem as wOlnen' s space. this definition may be authentic. The hareln is a
space for women, where men are forbidden. This separation creates a woman's space in
which "activities performed in the world of men for and by men must also be performed
in the world of women for and by women" (528). Ahmed argues that, rather than being
confined to this woman's space by nlen, it was women who instigated the segregation of
the harem (529). As Ahmed speculates in her conclusion, " .. .it seems to me that to
believe that segregated societies are by definition lnore oppressive to women, or that
women secluded from the company of men are women deprived, is only to allow
ourselves to be servilely obedient to the constructs of men" (531).
In re-examining the 111yth of the harem as a method of women's oppression, it is
also necessary to examine the Western nlyths about Western women. By accepting the
(male) Western stereotype of harems as a symbol of wonlen's segregation, Westerners
also accept their social segregation in the nuclear family. Many fenlinist scholars have

-

I
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...

exposed and refuted Western societies' assumptions about the inferiority of women, but
they have done so only in the Western context. At the sanle time that Western feminists
decry Middle Eastern Muslim women as oppressed under the veil and in the harem, they
also create their own myths that Western women are superior in their liberated status.
However, have not Western feminists decried the inferior status of the Western woman?
In The Feminine Mvstique, Betty Friedan exposed the isolation of the American
housewife, describing it as one of the only roles assigned to \vomen in the 1950s. Simone

-

de Beauvoir exposed similar ideas a decade before in France, claiming in The Second
Sex that women in Western societies are viewed as the abnormal gender, the Other. The
idea of the "second shift," in which nlen go to \vork then conle honle to relax while
WOlnen go to work then come home to do housework, still exists in the twenty-first
century. Given these negative images of the Western woman, is it still appropriate to

...
...

clailn that Western women are liberated, or at least any more so than Muslim women? Or
are Western women oppressed in their role as wife and mother isolated \vithin the nuclear
family just as Muslim women are oppressed in their segregation outside the harem?

-

I argue that we all impose metaphorical veils on others, in stereotyping other

-

peoples and traditions. Furthermore, in generalizing and dismissing others in our minds,

...

for physical survival that is no longer a pressing issue. Stereotyping and discrimination

-

lead to cycles of hate, violence and misery. Stereotyping also enslaves people to their

...

-

we veil ourselves to others' potential. Although it is human to classify and categorize the
world, and even to establish "us vs. them" dichotomies, this instinct arose out of a need

own minds, denying them the diversity of experience. While their attempts to eradicate
prejudice are noble, the menlbers of the European Union are occasionally guided by
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-

stereotypes. In heeding these stereotypes, nlember countries of the European Union are
veiling themselves to the potential good that could be achieved in uniting with the
European Muslim populations to create a new world system. Certainly, the French
secular law imposes veils on public school officials and students by training them to
assunle that girls wearing the hUab are oppressed. Rather than enacting a law that targets
those who practice their religion through dress, such as MuslitTI girls, the French
government needs to address the integration problems of Muslims and other ethnic

...

communities as well as to re-define iaicite to inel ude students who wear nloderate
religious symbols that do not interfere with the neutral school environment. By
immediately dismissing people based on personal stereotypes, we veil those individuals

...
...

-

...

-

in our minds. Unless we take the time to know and understand other people and their
experiences, no amount of legislation will eradicate these '''invisible'' veils .

-
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